A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology by Hewitt, Simon
Simon Hewitt*
A Cardinal Worry for Permissive
Metaontology
DOI 10.1515/mp-2015-0009
Abstract: Permissivist metaontology proposes answering customary existence
questions in the affirmative. Many of the existence questions addressed by
ontologists concern the existence of theoretical entities which admit precise
formal specification. This causes trouble for the permissivist, since individually
consistent formal theories can make pairwise inconsistent demands on the
cardinality of the universe. We deploy a result of Gabriel Uzquiano’s to show
that this possibility is realised in the case of two prominent existence debates
and propose rejecting permissivism in favour of substantive ontology conducted
on a cost–benefit basis.
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Quine declared the ontological question to be “what is there?”. The answer was
even briefer “everything”, with the metaphysical hard graft consisting in filling
in the details (Quine 1949). Since On What There Is the majority strand in
analytic metaphysics has devoted its attentions to the Quinean details, to
assaying the existents. Thousands upon thousands of words have been devoted
to the question of whether properties exist, others to which (if any) mereological
fusions are among the furniture of reality, still others to the supposed existence
of mathematical objects – to mention just three of the most prominent existence
questions considered by metaphysicians. This research project finds itself called
into question, however, by a growing constituency of permissivists. For the
permissivist, the existence questions commonly asked by metaphysicians – or
at least a significant number of them – lack depth and admit of purely trivial
answers.
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Permissivism
One sophisticated and recent version of permissivism is owing to Jonathan
Schaffer. He holds that, in all of our example cases, the answer to “Do Fs
exist?” is “of course”! Reading “Fs” as “numbers”, for instance, it suffices to
demonstrate the existence of numbers to note that there is a number between 2
and 3 (Schaffer 2009, 357). For Schaffer, the moral of the story is that metaphy-
sics shouldn’t focus on existence questions – which are easily resolved in the
typical cases, in favour of the existence of the disputed entities – but should
instead turn its attention to the structure of reality, and in particular to ground-
ing relations. Other permissivists are more uniformly hostile to substantial
metaphysics.1
In general define permissivism thus:
– (Perm:) For all F, assuming that Fs can be described without contradiction,
Fs exist.
Restrictions and mitigations of (Perm) are plentiful, for example, a somewhat
permissivist metaontology might replace “all” with “most”. Schaffer himself
insists that canonical descriptions of candidate F not include grounding infor-
mation. It is also important that “contradiction” be understood in a broad sense,
encompassing not simply sentences of the form pP ^ :Pq but also, for instance,
incompatible predicates. Permissivism need not commit a proponent to square
circles.2
It might seem that (Perm) is obviously false. Let phlogi be units of phlogis-
ton, such that any combustible body contains at least one phlogium. By (Perm),
it follows that phlogi exist. Yet, surely it is a settled result of chemistry that
phlogiston does not exist. Therefore, the argument goes, (Perm) is false. But this
is too hasty; the permissivist will retort, with an air of plausibility, that of course
phlogiston exists, it is a theoretical posit. We quantify over it when engaged in
scientific theory choice, and it is referred to by noun phrases in true declarative
sentences, such as “Phlogiston is a theoretical posit.” Unless we want to engage
in the costly enterprise of rejecting classical quantificational logic, the permissi-
vist case goes, we are committed to the existence of phlogiston. What we are not
committed to is the existence of phlogiston qua concrete physical reality. Prima
facie the response is a strong one.
1 Hofweber supplies one instance, thinking Schaffer’s alternative project unacceptably esoteric
(Hofweber 2009).
2 Of course a permissivist could be either a dialethist or a Meinongian, it’s just that we don’t
want to build these positions into the definition of permissivism.
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That said, having laid permissivism on the metaontological table, I now
want to argue that there is simple logico-mathematical reason that no version of
(Perm) which permits useful progress in metaontology can be true.
Cardinality and contradiction
Permissivism, if it is to be of any value in directing metaphysical research,
must surely adjudicate the key current ontological debates. An interesting
feature of these is that they often, perhaps even typically, concern theoretical
entities. By “theoretical entities” I mean proposed entities which (a) in key
cases at least, are not objects of everyday experience and thought, and (b)
admit of precise specification in a formal theory. The first of these conditions is
unsurprising. It is a far bolder philosopher who questions the existence of
tables than of esoteric mathematical objects, since the existence of tables looks
obvious.3 Subtleties arise around cases where some proposed type of entities
has tokens amongst the items of everyday encounter, but where these are
atypical of the type. My table is one of the many fusions that a believer in
unrestricted composition will admit to her ontology, but is atypical in being of
any particular concern to human beings and (modulo concerns about determi-
nacy) readily isolated as an object of reference. The question is whether there
are, in general, unrestricted fusions or, alternatively, whether there aren’t, in
spite of which my table (wrongly identified by the universalist as one of her
fusions) exists. It is precisely because many existence debates concern objects
whose existence is tracked by some kind of generation principle, like unrest-
ricted composition, that clear formal specification is important for grasping
what is at issue. Hence (b).
Here are two existence debates of the sort I have in mind:
– Mathematical realism: Mathematical platonists believe that sets exist.
Mathematical nominalists deny that sets exist.
– Composition: Universalists hold that for any things, xx, there is a fusion of
all and only the xx. Non-universalists deny this.4
Both are current debates in metaphysics, on which prominent philosophers
adopt positions. Both enjoy the advantage of admitting discussion in terms of
clearly formulated and well-understood mathematical theories, standard set
3 For notorious dissent, see van Inwagen (1990).
4 ‘“xx” here is a plural variable, ranging over some things in plurality. See Linnebo (2012).
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theory and extensional mereology, respectively. Permissivism holds out the
prospect of resolving both debates quickly: of course there are sets, of course
there are fusions. In both cases, after all, we can give a clear account of what is
required for the postulated entities to exist – the existence of the elements, in
the case of a set; that of the parts, in the case of fusions.5 What more could be
required? The debate over mathematical realism should be resolved quickly in
favour of the platonist, and that over composition in favour of the universalist.
Rather than wasting any more ink on these debates, the metaphysician should
turn her attention to other questions. Are parts dependent on the wholes they
constitute, or vice versa? Should set membership be understood as the converse
of a grounding relation?
Alas, there is trouble in permissivist paradise. As Gabriel Uzquiano has
shown, in the context of another discussion, acceptance of a very natural theory
of sets and a very natural theory of universal fusion, leads to contradiction if
quantification is understood as absolutely general (Uzquiano 2006). For suppose
that second-order ZFCSU6 is true. Suppose furthermore that the set membership
relation is absolutely general that anything can be an element. Then the cardin-
ality of the universe is strongly inaccessible, that is to say it is of cardinality
κ >0, such that there is no λ< κ where κ ¼ 2λ, and further that κ cannot be
reached by taking unions of sets of smaller cardinalities. Now suppose that
classical atomistic extensional mereology, formulated with plural (or otherwise
higher-order) quantifiers, is true. Suppose additionally, that the part- whole
relationship is absolutely general, that anything can be a part. Then the universe
has cardinality 2κ where κ is the number of atoms. Cantor’s theorem secures that
κ  2κ, and so specifically that the cardinality of the universe is not strongly
inaccessible. Thus, affirmation of ZFCSU and atomistic extensional mereology
against a background of higher-order and absolutely general quantification
leads straightforwardly to contradiction. It seems that we can’t, with no further
explanation, affirm the existence of both sets and fusions. And yet these are
paradigm cases of the objects of ontological dispute; if permissivism can’t help
us here, it is of limited value indeed.
The permissivist faces difficulty, then, but it might be thought that the
difficulty is not insurmountable. It is open to her to reject one or both of the
logical preconditions for deriving the contradiction, higher-order logic or abso-
lutely general quantification. In both cases, though, there is an unnatural feel to
5 From this gloss, which is in the spirit of Linnebo (2010), it follows immediately that nothing is
required of the world for the empty set to exist. A permissivist approach to the necessary
existence of pure mathematical entities might be forthcoming.
6 That is ZFC with urelemente and an axiom stating that the urelemente form a set.
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the abandonment. Higher-order quantification is well understood and essential
for capturing key mathematical structures (Shapiro 1991); in particular, there
would be a real loss were second-order quantifiers not admitted for the formula-
tion of set theory – as Boolos puts the point, the axioms of separation and
replacement are “crying out” for a second-order statement (Boolos 1998, 65).7 On
the other hand, the abandonment of absolutely general quantification in the
cause of preserving a metaontological project appears self-defeating, since the
very claims that project aspires to adjudicate are absolutely general in intended
application. The universalist doctrine that everything is a part of some whole is
not supposed to be about some restricted section of reality.
More promising is the suggestion that either the set theory or the mereology
be modified in order to block the contradiction. The most obvious target is the
axiom stating that the urelemente form a set, which is not standard fare in
mathematical practice. This non-adoption of the urelemente set axiom, however,
stems more from the question whether the non-sets form a set simply being one
with which mathematicians are not greatly concerned, rather than from a
considered rejection of the axiom. Once it is brought under consideration, it
looks quite reasonable (surely there can’t be that many non-sets). In any case,
mere rejection of the axiom does not resolve the difficulty over cardinality on the
assumption that the pure sets are in 1–1 correspondence with the universe
(Uzquiano 2006, 311).8 Perhaps, then, the mereology is the appropriate target
for modification. Here the weak point is the insistence on atomicity – that there
are no objects, all of whose parts have further proper parts. Could there not,
after all be gunk? (Sider 1993) Again, abandonment of atomicity alone will not
suffice to avoid the contradiction. This requires that the atomless sums be no
fewer than strongly inaccessible in number (Uzquiano 2006, 315). That there is
this much gunk is a serious ontological claim, and not the kind of auxiliary
premise we would expect to see imported at the stage of deciding on metaphy-
sical method.
This is the key point here: it is not that there are no arguments to be had
about the urelemente set, or about whether the universe is incredibly gunky, or
about some other proposed modification of set theory or mereology in order to
avoid the contradiction identified by Uzquiano. Instead, the problem is that once
7 A more moderate moderation of the background logic would involve adopting second-order
logic with Henkin semantics, and then appealing to the downward Löwenheim–Skolem theo-
rem to the effect that both the set theory and the mereology have countable models. The
problem here is finding a non-ad hoc motivation for abandoning standard semantics.
Williamson supplies a recent defence of this semantics (Williamson 2013, 229–30).
8 For an argument in favour of this assumption, see Uzquiano (2006).
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we engage in these arguments we are involved in substantial discussion of what
there is, or what there might be. Recall from our earlier examination of debates
about theoretical entities that formal specification is central to determining what
is at issue in existence debates. To put the matter more precisely: for a theory Γ,
the question whether the existence claims contained in the closure of Γ under
logical consequence are true is a debate about the existence of a type of
theoretical entity. When we discuss, for instance, whether sets that do not
include an urelemente set exist, we are doing ontology. Whereas when we
embarked on discussion of permissivism, we were supposed to be talking
about metaontology. This in itself might not be a problem – maybe a holism
which does not set up a clear boundary between metaphysics and the discussion
of metaphysical methodology, but rather allows considerations from one to bear
on the other, is the correct approach in this area.
Even so, the permissivist is now in an embarrassing position. For the kinds
of questions raised in the attempt to rescue permissivism about sets and fusions
from contradiction are precisely the kinds of questions from which permissivism
was supposed to rescue metaphysics. Whether there are sets and fusions, and if
so which sets and fusions there are, and which principles of composition can be
appealed to in answering this latter question – these are familiar fixtures on the
philosophical agenda. If a permissivist metaontology moves us to revisit them as
a priority, it is clearly a lot less ground-changing than its proponents suggest.
Metaphysics is not trivial!
Permissivism promises a generous ontology and the saving of philosophical
labour. For a large class of candidate F, permissivists propose to answer the
question “Do Fs exist?” with a swift “yes” in accordance with (Perm). The
problem here, as we have seen is that commitments which might be individually
acceptable – to sets with a general membership relation, or to fusions with a
general parthood relation9 − and which the permissivist, in her own terms,
should be expected to accept, ensnare us in contradiction when accepted jointly.
That commitments that are individually unproblematic may be contradictory
in combination is unsurprising. It is, for example, the basis of the Bad Company
problem for neo-Fregeanism. Yet recognition of the possibility of mutually
incompatible commitments is extremely damaging to permissivism. A principle
9 There are other examples that could be given. Uzquiano himself instances Fine’s General
Theory of Abstraction as making cardinality demands.
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such as (Perm) suggests a method of metaphysical enquiry where postulated
existents appear individually before the ontological dock, each to receive admis-
sion into the catalogue of the universe. Against this, the moral of our contra-
diction is surely that commitments should be considered in combination.
Metaphysics, like any science, needs to proceed by considering the way its
various commitments interact, modifying or rejecting them in order to avoid
contradiction, and making decisions about how to do this by weighing up costs
and benefits. An immediate corollary is that the ontological question is not
trivial. Assaying the existents is a substantial metaphysical task.10
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